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ABSTRACT This essay addresses the “demand for
humanism, with a nod toward Asia” (Spivak)
within current theory and global intellectual
political culture. I argue that using humanism as a
way to understand China (a habit inside and
especially outside the PRC) keeps us within the
orientalist tradition; it is also at odds with China’s
attempted/failed/ongoing revolution and
trajectory since 1949. I offer an interdisciplinary
analysis of area studies and other representations
of China, especially in regard to Tiananmen and
the Cultural Revolution. I then contrast this with
current intellectual debates in China as well as
with an older Maoist or revolutionary discourse.
The resurgence or “demand” for humanism is
rendered as part of an intellectual and political
backlash or depoliticization.
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ism, however ambiguous; for quality control; to fight terrorism.
—Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline
> This epigraph from Spivak takes us to the heart ofthe matter: the enduring presence if not resurgence of
“humanism” within academe and the larger, global intel-
lectual political culture of which it is a part. This “demand” is a sign of
the times. Edward Said’s posthumous Humanism and Democratic
Criticism (2004) collected several pieces of his essaying the need
for a “new” and critical humanism, though he conceptualizes this in
largely philological, textualist terms that were always fully implicit to
even the more radical and Foucauldian Orientalism (1979) (about
which more later). Cynthia G. Franklin’s Academic Lives (2009) sur-
veys the return to humanism in a host of recent academic memoirs
that reflect on the rise of and limits to poststructuralist theory,
especially its critiques of individualism and humanism. Within the
humanities in particular, it is hard not to perceive a reaction not just
against the readily admitted “excesses” or arthritic jargonizing of
some types of cultural and literary studies but to theory in general,
to “high” theory in the manner of the early French imports but also
to more politically committed, philosophically driven, and radical—
root-seeking—critique. Not only have most of those early, influential
sources passed away literally (e.g., Jacques Derrida and Michel
Foucault), but there has been no next “wave” of note. This is to say
that theory is not “dead” so much as fully incorporated and domesti-
cated into already existing fields and practices. As Kenneth Surin has
noted, French-inspired theory had an “inbuilt propensity to blur its
constitutive genres” (2011: 4). What this meant was that it was not
simply inter- but, more fatefully, anti- or at least trans-disciplinary and
therefore not capable of genuinely challenging the disciplines or the
production of knowledge (a goal that theory was thought to have
demanded). Perhaps this is too tall an order for any intellectual
phenomenon, but it may also be that theory’s—this type of theo-
ry’s—lack of what Timothy Brennan (2006: 147–68) has called an
“organizational imaginary” and politics also had a role in its own
domestication. Without such a reorganization of the disciplines, the-
ory’s insights into, for example, the social construction of reality and
knowledge or the “play” of power, interest, and politics in our basic
orientations to the world could only run out of steam. It is not that
humanism, universalism, the individual were defeated and now
return. They were never quite displaced. The disciplines could and
did get back to business as usual. One also has to note, crucially,
the speeding up and corporatization of academic or intellectual labor
such that quick and at times superficial applications of theory
became the general rule. Humanism can easily reemerge under
such conditions. Given all of this, as well as the simple exhaustion
of the theoretical streams—for example, how many times can you
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describe negotiated identities, deconstructive texts, and socially
constructed facts?—it is not hard to see a restoration of the fallback
and “natural” discursive position of the scholar-intellectual—that is,
humanism.
These changes have also gone hand in hand with larger, global
ones. The current conjuncture has been variously described as the
new—and humanitarian—imperialism, as neoliberalism, the end of
sovereignty (human, national, and otherwise), the rise of “human
rights” movements and rhetoric, an age of biopolitics or biopower,
the reduction to “‘bare life, and so on. For all their differences these
terms show an at least implicit concern with the status of “the
human” and humanism within the global scene. Even the Schmittian
notion of depoliticization, recently deployed to rethink post-Mao
China, among other places, can be understood as a historical trans-
formation of the Aristotelian notion of man as a political animal. So
what we have, within the academy and larger intellectual political
culture as well as the “real world” of geopolitics, is a persistent
and renewed focus on the human, the individual (who usually stands
heroically, sentimentally against the State or is at least a victim of it),
and some type of political or universal humanism. For my purposes,
what is most striking in Spivak’s point is the connection to “Asia.”
With the rise of China in particular, humanism seems to know a
renewed lease on life. It is as if there is no other way to relate to
the other than this (excluding overt forms of racism, exoticization,
and so on). In what follows I seek to complicate this humanist come-
back by delineating its roots—that is, some of its roots—within
orientalism. My aim is not simply to dismiss humanism as lacking
a critical edge and philosophical rigor but to examine its place within a
larger discourse and a two-sided problem: the problem of how China
is represented and the turn to the right or toward depoliticization
today. My main focus is on the resurgent use of “humanism” to
interpret Maoist and post-Mao China.
But at the outset let me further index the context of this essay’s
intervention via a few quick examples: within China, the Olympic slo-
gan “One World One Dream” (common humanity and the “spirit “
represented by the Games); a Harvard conference titled “Humanistic
International: Humanism, China, Globalism” (2010) as well as a
glowing report on that event in the New York Times (Tatlow 2010);
the recent, pulpbiography Mao: The Untold Story (Chang and Halliday
2005) (in which Mao Tse-tungdupes and murders hundreds of
millions of Chinese) as well as slightly more academic titles like
The Age of Openness: China before Mao (Dikotter 2008) (Mao and
the revolution are what blocked the flourishing of humanity and free-
dom in China); the portraits of ordinary Chinese since the late 1970s
in the photographic exhibit titled Humanism in China, which was pre-
sented by the Guangdong Museum of Art and toured the United
States–West (Open Democracy 2010b); and yearly remembrances
in the Western and global media of the 1989 protests (and
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subsequent bloody crackdown) in Tiananmen Square. Despite the
admittedly wide variety of texts and signs here, the emphasis sub-
tending all of them is a common humanity and natural or at least
proper order of things lurking under the obvious differences between
things (and people) Chinese and non-Chinese.
This sameness and universality is at the heart of the concept of
humanism no matter where it is deployed. Let us take another far-
flung example, from recent work published in a private, erstwhile
“postmodern” journal of the US humanities. As a recent title indi-
cates—“Confucianism, Humanism, and Human Rights”—the good,
true humanism focused on the properly autonomous and free indi-
vidual is crucial for understanding modern China as well as for curing
its and the whole world’s cultural and political ills after the age of Mao
and revolution. That type of humanism is what is needed, and it
stands opposed to the “totalitarian,” bad humanism and despotism
of either Mao or Confucius (Waters 2009). Moreover this “new”
humanism is also clearly if implicitly posed against the type of leftist
“antihumanist” theory and radical critique that poses difficult and
uncomfortable questions not only about humanism but about capi-
talism, imperialism, Eurocentrism, orientalism, and so on—not to
mention direct questions of race, gender, and sexuality. This inter-
vention from the right, or, to put it more charitably, this depoliticiza-
tion, is not announced as such. But for anyone familiar with the
original political intent of the theoretical antihumanisms, or with
the history of actually existing humanism in the West, it still rings
loudly. Precisely zero mention is made of the political, philosophical,
and historical challenges to this generic humanism. Another article in
the same journal examines the Chinese conception of the properly
selfless, exemplary human and finds it to be lacking (yet endanger-
ing) something that is assumed to be real—apparently, again, the
value of individuality and the autonomous or independent self
(Davies 2010).
All of my opening examples above are each separate events with
their own local contexts, constituencies, and purposes.1 My point is
not to argue that they are identical: that would be the logic of human-
ism in the first place. At the same time, humanism’s denial of his-
torical and contextual specificities should not preclude us from
analyzing global, homologous phenomena. It is in this sense that
these above examples index a renewed appeal of the concept or
discursive “thing” called humanism—both in China (as the inclusion
of the photographic/portraiture exhibit is meant to suggest) and in
the West. More specifically, there is a demand to use China as the
site or proof of the universal validity of humanism. That this can and
does happen both in China and outside it does not mean that, say,
Chinese Marxist- or neo-Confucian humanism and the old-fashioned,
literary humanism of middlebrow American intellectuals are the
same. But it does mean—I will insist—that there is a global trend
and incitement to discourse worth examining here, not least in terms
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of its politics. I will briefly examine recent, if faded, Chinese returns to
humanism below. But my focus in this essay is much more on the
Western or perhaps chiefly American context of this demand for
humanism. I interrogate the deployment of humanism as a way of
understanding modern China in general and the Mao era in particular.
This development has to be situated within and in part explained
by the long history and enduring phenomenon of orientalism, a thing
that is still too much with us even if it has taken different, “sinologi-
cal,” and Cold War–inflected characteristics since the time of Said’s
classic work (see Vukovich 2011; Hevia 2003; Chan 2009.).2 Put
another way, this turn to humanism is a backlash or a return to an
essentially antitheoretical and, more important, an anti- or depoliti-
cizing mode of discourse and cultural politics. It is neither a discovery
nor an innovation; it seeks to take us back to the good old days before
theory on the one hand and before postcolonial, anti-imperialist, or
other forms of radical critique on the other.
HUMAN, ALL TOO MANY HUMANISMS
One has to emphasize that “humanism”—like its cognate terms
“cosmopolitanism” and “liberalism”—is a slippery as well as con-
tentious concept. It has a long history in China, for example, where
one can speak of a “Confucian humanism” that long predates its
more recent avatars. One can note as well the rise—and fall—of
the “humanist spirit” and Marxist-humanist debates in the 1980s.
Of course, there is the humanism of the early republican period, the
New Culture Movement, and May Fourth intellectuals in particular.
Part of the internationally celebrated, “New Leftist” Wang Huiaims in
his scholarly work at recovering and reconstructing the discourse of
humanism in early modern Chinese thought. (This does not make him
a humanist per se, as he is sometimes represented to be.) There is
also recent work in China that seeks to recover the humanistic Xue
Heng school of the 1920s (the “reactionaries” opposed to the May
Fourth progressives) and the influence of the American conservative
Irving Babbitt. But to raise the contextual specificity of Chinese
humanisms is to point to one of the insurmountable flaws in the
concept: its universalist pretensions. For if there are Chinese human-
isms, then either “humanism” is not actually universal even in geo-
graphic terms or, alternatively, there really is a common essence that
unites all the humanisms and all their humans. It is the latter point
that was, after all, the breaking point for the theoretical antihuman-
ism of various Marxisms and poststructuralisms.
As in the past, I do not think that the “new” discourse of humanism
in China or elsewhere can stand up to criticism. We have been there
before. As Pal Ahluwalia notes, the many varieties of humanism
“nevertheless signif[y] that there is something universal and given
about human nature and that it can be determined in the language of
rationality” (2010: 62). One might add the inescapable emphasis on
the individual or the philosophy of consciousness and the auton-
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omous subject. In sum, from Louis Althusser’s accounts of ideology
and of history as a “process without a subject,” Chakrabarty’s (and
others’) provincializing of Europe and History, Miche`le Le Doeuffe’s
critiques of masculinism in philosophy, to Foucault’s “grid” of power
and “end of man” as well as Karl Marx’s, Friedrich Nietzsche’s, and
Sigmund Freud’s earlier decenterings of the subject, there would
seem to be no good, theoretical reason for the return to humanism.
Politically, one would be hard pressed to make a case for the histori-
cal or future successes of humanism as a political doctrine or
animating theory or desire. I do not believe such a debate has
taken place. What has happened has been an end-run around the
various political and epistemological critiques of and challenges to
humanism.
The case of Marxist humanism in 1980s China is instructive. After
arising as a fairly sentimental but also earnest, passionate critique
of alienation under the socialist state system (i.e., as part of de-
Maoification among the intellectuals), it quickly disappeared from
the scene. Partly this is because it wanted what it couldn’t have in
China or indeed anywhere else: an independent space and role for
intellectuals, free of the state’s demands and strictures but also
from the rising market system in China. Of course, this was and
remains a structural and “objective” dilemma for intellectuals every-
where. It is a fundamental problem of modernity as much as a roman-
tic desire for self-determination and an arguably neo-Confucian
desire to be the conscience of the nation. As it turns out, one of
the problems with the Marxist humanists was something they shared
with other partisans in the “humanist spirit” debates: much time was
spent writing and debating the existence of such a thing as a human
spirit and its alleged alienation or loss under Mao and feudalism (the
two terms being conjoined in this line of thought). This may be seen
as a detour from the more urgent and necessary task of analyzing, in
historical and materialist terms, the actually existing function and
place of intellectuals and the trajectories of the state in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Were intellectuals and artists merely state
cadres, and why is this a good or bad thing? This might have allowed
the self-professed humanists and Marxists to see the impending rise
of the capitalist market and a consumer culture that spelled doom for
intellectuals in general, state employed or otherwise. As Wang Hui
himself has argued, these post-Mao-era humanists offered no cri-
tique of either the ideology or teleology of modernization and in that
sense “accelerated the ‘secularization’ of society—the development
of capitalist commodification” (2001: 169).3 It is for this same
reason that Wang argues that this post-Mao “return” to humanism
is very different from the humanism of the late Qing and May Fourth-
erasin that some of these earlier intellectuals had a critique of both
traditional Chinese politics and culture and the oncoming Western
and modern onslaught. As an intellectual movement seeking in part
to critique the control and subsumption during the revolutionary de-
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cades of—in their view—properly “free” and “independent” intellec-
tuals, the last wave of post-Mao Chinese humanism threw the baby of
anticapitalist Marxist theory out with the bathwater of bureaucratic
control.
Whatever the limits and problems of the Mao decades’ treatment
of intellectuals—and this was a major failure of the party-state that
came back to haunt Mao’s legacy among the intellectuals—the num-
ber done to this class fraction by post-Tiananmen capitalist expan-
sion has been far more devastating in terms of their social power and
cultural capital. If in the revolutionary period the aim was to proletar-
ianize intellectuals, produce organic ones from the masses, and
smash the fauxuniversalism of traditional intellectuals, artists, and
culture, in the post-Mao era the traditional role of intellectuals and
the possibility of universal, consensual truths and values have been
brought to an end by the full-on commodification of Chinese culture
and society. The latter point here is, at least, the razor-sharp argu-
ment of Shanghai University professor Cai Xiang.4 Thus those
“humanist spirit’ debates have more or less petered out: whether
in terms of leftist, nationalist, populist, liberal, or neoliberal pos-
itions and debates (and note the variety of streams), the pressing
questions are less about the loss of a certain “spirit” than about the
contradictions of reform, the market, and party-state development-
alism under globalization.5 The current debates on “new leftism” and
even neo-Confucianism in particular are important: they speak to
political economy and historiography, on the one hand, and to at
least the idea—howsoever controversial—of Chinese specificity
and tradition as against liberal/humanist universalism, on the
other.6 For many New Left intellectuals this includes the Maoist or
revolutionary/socialist past; as Gan Yang has put it, the radical ega-
litarianism of actually existing Maoism (1949–79) remains one of
China’s three historical traditions (with Confucianism and an ambig-
uous enlightenment/Dengism/market economy) (Gan 2007; Bell
2008: 178). Others have queried if there might be a “China model”
not for the rest of the world to follow but that might describe what the
PRC has been doing and could do better in its breakneck pursuit of
modernization and development.7 As for Chinese liberalism, it too is
at its strongest and most political when it calls not for the restoration
of a lost spirit but for the outright privatization of land and state-
owned enterprises, greater marketization, and so on.8 All of this is
post-Tiananmen and posthumanist despite any appearances to the
contrary.
One problem with humanism as it has been theorized and prac-
ticed to date, then, is that it is not an enemy of capitalist moderniz-
ation but an important, if silent, partner. This seems to be the case in
China and globally. Therefore it is also worth recalling an earlier
Saidian insight here: “Liberal humanism, of which Orientalism has
historically been one department, retards the process of enlarged
and enlarging meaning through which true understanding can be
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attained” (Said 1979: 254). Said’s posthumous defense of critical
philological humanism (2004), perhaps in part due to its simply being
unfinished, does not resolve or even fully address this contradiction
between humanism’s imperial legacy and his own call for a far more
worldly one. What we are left with in regard to Said, then, is a tension
between this final appeal to humanism largely, ultimately conducted
as a matter of faith and, for example, the theoretical antihumanism
of classical Marxism (including Mao) but also Aime´ Ce´saire, Frantz
Fanon, and others including the early to middle Foucault as well as
Althusser. If we are no longer in the age of Mao et al., we are also
clearly not in Erasmus’s or Erich Auerbach’s. Said remained keenly
aware of what he saw as the abuses of humanism, and much of his
final volume reads as an indictment of that tradition. But given that
indictment and the enduring power of orientalism—the uneven and
hierarchical production of knowledge in the world—it is hard to see
how humanism is a concept worth trying to produce anew. And, as
before, there is no necessary relation between Said’s great, critical,
and textual practice and this same concept.
THE HUMANIST’S ORIENT, MAOISM AS INHUMANISM
The demand for humanism today must be about something else. Not
the rediscovery of an essential discourse in tune with human nature,
or the foundation of individuals speaking Truth to Power, but a shift—
the demand or resurgence—within our intellectual-political culture.
To begin with, we need to deal with that nod toward Asia, that is,
China. It has not escaped anyone’s attention in recent years that
China is not only irresistibly rising (even within the recent financial
tsunami) but in some sense has already arisen. One answer to the
question of why China and humanism, then, has to do with this. The
use of humanism to interpret or even change China (from the outside
or inside) may be a response—something like a denial or displace-
ment—to the difference and dissonance that this rise of China
poses. In the face of a powerful, booming, multitudinous China,
one filled with a variety of official and popular, sometimes strident
nationalisms as well as a resilient party-state with substantial legiti-
macy and an apparent resistance to (Western) liberal political reform,
a universalist humanism reasserts itself. Underneath that differ-
ence, particularity, and/or antagonism—especially in regard to the
Chinese political system and its apparent legitimacy despite being
allegedly “despotic”—they must be the same as “us,” subjectively or
existentially speaking
There can be no better illustration for this humanist drive and logic
of sameness underneath Chinese difference than the legendary Tank
Man and the larger Tiananmen protests of 1989 with which he is
linked. The Tank Man, it will be recalled, is the unknown figure who
seemingly held off a row of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tanks on
the morning of June 5; plastic shopping bag in hand, he stood in front
of a line of tanks, zigzagging with their movement until some bystand-
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ers pulled him aside. Virtually nothing is known of the man except for
this fuzzy footage, but he is one of the most immediately recognizable
images of the past fifty years (see Gordon 1999). The Tank Man is
also one of Time magazine’s top one hundred people of the twen-
tiethcentury and is also the subject of an American PBS documen-
tary. He is indeed fascinating, especially in his afterlife: a number of
people have claimed to be him (most recently, a Taiwanese e´migre´),
and in that same summer of 1989 the Chinese state—cleverly, it
must be said—used the very same footage of him as an example of
the restraint, perhaps even the humanity, of the military forces during
the same events. (They did not run him over but repeatedly tried to
move out of his way.) But my interest here is in the appeal of the
paradoxically singular yet everyman status of the figure. The following
passage expresses what many others, or at least many Americans,
seem to have felt: “I had been trying to hitch a ride to China ever
since the events at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. While those
events made most Americans certain they did not want to know any-
thing about such a violent, repressive nation, I saw signs of hope in
the symbols that emerged from those events—Lady Liberty was tan-
talizing; Tank Man, the individual who defied a column of tanks, was
unforgettable” (Waters 2009: 217). This extract and its longer essay
assume the momentousness of the 1989 events (something not at
all obvious for people within the PRC) and the usual antiregime per-
spective of Western intellectuals. This reading is understandable in
the context of Tiananmen. But, more important, it speaks to the uni-
versality of the—undefined—meaning or feeling of what the Tank
Man and 1989 represent (“hope,” freedom, civil society, the triumph
of the human spirit, and so forth). As much as one has to be impres-
sed by the actions of the Tank Man, this is nonetheless a problematic
interpretation and more a cathexis than anything else. As the misrec-
ognition of the Goddess of Democracy indicates (it was never called
“Lady Liberty”), there is something very American about this reading
of the meaning of the Tank Man, to say nothing of the faith in the
unalloyed goodness of individualism that this essay also asserts.9
A writer in the Asia Times opines: “I was never more proud to be an
American than when the Goddess of Democracy statue, with its stun-
ning resemblance to Lady Liberty... made its way through Tiananmen
Square. That... made it all the more frustrating to see and hear the
protest leaders bungle the principles for which they presumably
stood” (LaMoshi 2003). This too is an assimilation of the other
through nonrecognition. We can recall as well CBS news anchor
Dan Rather during the same protests: while entirely unsure of what
the protestors were actually saying, he pointed to the Goddess and,
regarding what the protestors wanted, stated that the statue “said it
all.” This is ideology at work (imposing obviousnesses as obvious-
nesses). It also unites with the other two examples in reinscribing the
demands of the actual protestors into two other orders of things: the
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“confines” of liberal democratic capitalism on the one hand (as
Slavoj Zˇizˇek [1998] notes) and liberal humanism on the other.
Indeed, the standard criticism of the student leaders, as articu-
lated, for example, by the makers of the famous/infamous area-
studies documentary The Gate of Heavenly Peace (which also
features the Tank Man of course) is that they were not quite liberal-
humanist enough. The students—who were only a part of the move-
ment by its end and greatly outnumbered by workers and others—
were tragically too radical and stuck in the Maoist past despite their
apparent desire for “democracy” and freedom. Beholden to their
(Chinese) revolutionary political culture, the students did not realize
that “when people abandon hope for a perfect future and faith in great
leaders, they are returned to the common dilemmas of humanity. And
there—in personal responsibility, in civility, in making sacred the
duties of ordinary life—a path may be found.”10 As a politics, as
opposed to a New-Age-Buddhist-cum-humanist ethos, this is pretty
weak tea. It depoliticizes Tiananmen and the PRC. It offers a human-
ist spin and a Cold War orientalist narrative about totalitarianism in
the East. As others have argued, the screening of Tiananmen and
therefore China is intimately bound up with the problematic of orient-
alism and the writing of the other (see Chow 1991; Vukovich 2009).
Nineteen eighty-nine not only defines the PRC more than any other
event but constructs it as being in a world-historical process of
becoming-the-same as the United States–West: normal, full of indi-
viduals and not subjects/slaves, and forming a bourgeois civil so-
ciety. Or as failing to meet that norm. Today Tiananmen remains
something one cannot publish on easily in China, and this helps
explain its relative nonimportance to PRC residents and the circula-
tion of trite, humanist interpretations of the events.
And yet the basic event of that spring—the massive protests, the
killings in the aftermath—are also far from unknown within China.
They are less a secret and more a victory of propaganda (including the
example of Russia after 1991) and the waves of depoliticization that
have swept the PRC and much of the world since. But it is also the
great “success” of the Chinese economy and the massive changes
within the PRC that further explain the “nonimportance” of 1989
within Chinese political culture—the same changes that have in
effect nullified the humanist spirit debates. And we have to turn to
a nonhumanist and effectively anti-orientalist interpretation of 1989
to better understand its significance and potentials. Wang Hui
(2003: 117) has argued that ultimately the repression was about
restoring the “links among market mechanisms that had begun to
fail” in the late 1980s and that created the social dislocations and
discontent behind the protests. In the event, 1989 marked the com-
ing onslaught of neoliberalism and the eventual weakening or cap-
ture of the state by capital. So, too, there is now enough work
available in English to see that Tiananmen 1989 was also very
much a workers movement and that this—a de facto general strike
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in Beijing—was the real threat (see Lu 1990; Walder and Gong
1993).
It is precisely the cathexis and articulation of China and human-
ism—via the Tank Man, Tiananmen, victims of Mao, dissidents in the
media, or whatever else is ready-to-hand—that is the problem here. It
is powerfully ahistorical and occludes a production of knowledge,
even within the academy, that is better rooted in sociohistorical re-
ality and more useful for understanding Chinese politics. Whatever
political problems exist in China and between China and the world,
they are not helped by the assumption of a common humanity,
human nature, and so on that underlies Chinese difference. It pre-
vents us from taking seriously Chinese political cultures and his-
tories and the self-understanding of Chinese subjects, today as
well as in earlier decades.
One fundamental aspect of this history and political culture has to
do with the one era that is perhaps the most maligned of all: the
actually existing Chinese revolution and Mao decades. Much of the
new orientalism about China turns upon the demonization of this
period and the former chairman himself. It is this that Tiananmen
was supposed to—and for much of the global audience, symbolically
did—make a break from: from communist/oriental despotism to
common humanity, making the everyday and the individual sacred
and so forth. Hence the existence of so many currently in-print Mao
biographies (nearly all of them negative or in the form of pulp “ex-
pose´s”)—despite the party’s own, strenuous efforts to disavow its
Maoist past, aside from preserving Mao as nationalist Father of
course.11 In short, whereas Tank Man represents universal human-
ity, Mao and Maoism represent inhumanism. This much is fully im-
plicit in the following pronouncement by Andrew J. Nathan.
Immediately preceding his reference to the “unworthiness” and
blind faith of “Mao’s people” he remarks:
[The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)] built a system that tied
the peasants to the land, kept consumption to a minimum,
fixed each person permanently in place in a work unit domina-
ted by a single party secretary against whom there was no
appeal, classified each individual as a member of a good or
bad class, and called on each citizen to show that he or she was
progressive by demonstrating enthusiasm for disciplining him-
self and persecuting others. Mao’s people complied out of
patriotism, a sense of unworthiness, faith in a despot’s wis-
dom, and because they preferred to be among the victimizers
than among the victims. (Nathan 1990: 215).
The “facts” mentioned here are certainly tendentious; the above is a
generic stereotype that has the burden of standing in for the whole
era, from the land reform of the 1940s up through Tiananmen and
that “unforgettable individual,” the Tank Man. But the connection to
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an implicit humanism is crucial. Not just Mao but several hundred
million Chinese were effectively inhuman. In addition to being of
bad character, the Chinese have (or had) no agency and are entirely
statemanipulated, willfully carrying out repressive policy. They were
doing the opposite of what they were supposed to do: to be “free”
from all control and social determination, or at least to possess the
negative freedom of not determining or being determined by any
other person or thing. It’s that old liberal-humanist dream of a
world without power and where actual power is only repressive,
never productive or inevitable in a complex society. In keeping with
the Gate documentary.
The discourse of universal humanism is what is fully assumed
here—as is, again, the reinscription of the post-1949 “continuous
revolution” into the terms of liberal democratic capitalism. This is
all predicated on the denial of Maoist or Chinese-revolutionary
discourse. By that I mean the affective and passionate yet rational-
practical framework by which the Chinese made sense of and acted in
the world at that time. That the majority of Chinese participants, even
today, do not see that era and their own activity in the “humanist” way
proffered by Nathan, matters not. I will return to self-understanding
and Maoist discourse shortly. But for now it must be said that Nathan
and others beg a number of questions about the remarkable mass
mobilizations and “mass democracy” of the Mao years. Those cam-
paigns, from the land reform onward (excluding the late, esoteric
“Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign”)00 were remarkable
not just for their intensity and violence but for their popularity and
grass-rootedness: those forms of participatory legitimacy elided by
procedural notions of democracy and negative liberty.
MAOISM AS INHUMANISM, 2: ON FUNDAMENTALISM AND
EXTREMISM
Anti-Maoist rhetoric should seem familiar in the years following the
“war against terror,” as anyone following recent political develop-
ments in Nepal and rural India can attest. We should remind our-
selves that it is not only Islam-centered area studies that are in the
business of studying, documenting, and ferreting out “fundamental-
ists” real and imagined. In an essay on Australia-China relations, for
example, Geremie R. Barme´ (2002) makes a flippant but striking
reference to the days of “Mao bin Laden—or is it Osama Zedong?”
Earlier, Edward Friedman summed up the four decades of Maoist
governance thusly: “The Chinese people, who fell a humiliating
half-century behind their East Asian neighbours, are still paying the
heavy price for the crimes and errors of Mao’s fundamentalist ways”
(1987: 154). The assumption of poor economic performance in the
Mao era has always been misleading, just as many recent studies
argue for its past success and present indispensability for the post-
Mao takeoff (Bramall 1993; Kueh 2008).12 To say that China is
backward and behind is to deny it contemporaneity (coevalness).
[Q1] Please check footnote
citation for
00
.
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But what is remarkable is the figure of “fundamentalism”—an anti-
thesis of “humanism”—appearing in China-focused texts. This goes
beyond the Kremlinological shibboleths of totalitarianism and police
states to racialize Mao and “Mao’s people” (as they used to be
called) as benighted others. The “fundamentalist” connection I am
drawing may seem merely metaphorical, but there is a long history of
lumping all of the Orient together, even before Maoism ever had the
opportunity to be demonized. This imaginary link between Maoism
and (Islamic) fundamentalism can be further seen in the American
novel Mao II. There Don DeLillo equates Maoism with the “cult” of the
Korean “Moonies” and a Lebanese “terrorist” group in war-torn Bei-
rut in a global, oriental chain of equivalence (1991: 16, 163, 235). All
these representations turn upon the threat to the autonomy and
“individuality” of the liberal subject and the dream of a life free of
social determinants. So strong is the demonization of Maoism as
akin to a retrograde Islamic fundamentalism that it appears in quite
different fields of scholarship. Take for instance Dennis Klass and
Robert Goss’s article in Death Studies that equates Maoism with
Wahhabi Islam. Both movements represent societies that “brutally”
“police” death and mourning rituals in the name of new, statist
cultural “grief narratives” that aim to destroy family identity (Klass
and Goss 2003: 794, 807).
What strikes one is less the ideas or facts that are marshaled than
the positing of the equivalence. They yoke together different cultures,
political programs, and moments in history, all in the name of scoring
points against an unholy trinity of Maoism, “backwardness,” and
fundamentalism. The problem is less comparison than reification.
There is a failure to take seriously the contextual specificity and
difference of the texts/problems at hand or to provide some measure
of methodological self-reflexivity. In such equations of Maoism with
fundamentalism the only—and unacknowledged—material, con-
crete link is that the subjects are not white. They are also inhuman.
This type of thinking is of a piece with classical, liberal humanist
orientalism.
A further sign of the articulation between Maoism and fundamen-
talist “extremism” is the often-repeated equation of Maoism with
the Nazi holocaust and fascism. The referent here is that great
obsession of the memoir industry and of the China-watching mind
in general: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Thus Vera
Schwarcz (1996) and Tu Wei-ming (1996) draw a straight line from
Hitler, the Storm Troopers, and Auschwitz to the decades of Maoist
rule and the Cultural Revolution in particular. Here the link is not
argued so much as asserted as an obviousness; it rests entirely on
the “fact” that in both cases there were mass (aka popular) mobiliz-
ations, violence, and suffering. And yet under this same criterion it is
hard to imagine any significant historical period of change that would
not fit the bill, from the US labor movement between the world wars to
all the modern revolutions and decolonizations from 1776 onward.
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Note, too, that the death toll of the Cultural Revolution decade appar-
ently lies somewhere between thirty-four thousand and as much as
four hundred thousand (Meisner 1996: 47; 1986: 371–73). A terri-
ble toll either way but simply of a lesser order than the Holocaust.
A. James Gregor (2000) has also argued forcefully against that
stream in historiography that wants to equate Maoism (and/or the
Guomindang) with European fascism.
Gao Mobo has further addressed the Cultural Revolution–
Holocaust link, arguing that the violence in China was not planned
by the state but was committed by various groups at different times
and for different reasons. These cases range from personal revenge
to revolutionary zeal (classstruggle in violent friend/enemy forms) as
well as actual armed fighting akin to civil war (the latter caused the
great majority of deaths) (Gao 2002). Nonetheless, the Cultural
Revolution did bring important benefits to some people—namely,
in terms of improving human welfare and the great increases in
rural education and healthcare and in establishing (or continuing) a
radically egalitarian “right to rebel” within Chinese political culture. It
is highly misleading to see it as a cultural wasteland in which no other
activity other than fighting and “struggle sessions” and “rusticated
labor” took place. For one thing, as Wang Zheng has noted, the popu-
lation increased rapidly during the era, and this tells us something
about the limits of alleged sexual puritanism during the Cultural
Revolution.13 In addition to high economic growth from 1969 through
1976 and beyond, there were a number of other advances—from the
model operas and local, “amateur” theater to the explosion of unof-
ficial presses and some significant if short-lived changes in worker
management in factories. While such a relatively positive or nuanced
view of the Cultural Revolution remains controversial in China and
abroad, many people working inside and outside the PRC have tried
to make a case for its complexities or benefits and its potentialities
for the present. Indeed, “revisionist” and affirmative works on the
Cultural Revolution that take that upheaval seriously—in empirical
and theoretically nonhumanist ways—have slowly but surely begun
to emerge in English-language scholarship as well as e-media within
China.14 It is because enough people are alive to recall the era dif-
ferently, as well as for more existential and so-called nostalgic
reasons, the Cultural Revolution and Maoism—as signs of revolution
and streams of intense political affect—remain part of the political
and ideological reservoir of meanings and images in China (see, e.g.,
Zhou and Liu 2010). It is this, and not condescending, orientalist
notions of brainwashing and political underdevelopment, that
explains why Maoist images, icons, and slogans appeared in Tianan-
men Square in 1989 as well as in more recent strikes and protests. It
is not the case that the Chinese and their political culture are inhu-
man or malformed because of their (some of their) attachments to
Mao and the revolution and its discourse.
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MAOIST DISCOURSE AND THE CRITIQUE OF HUMANISM
I lack the space to “cover” the Cultural Revolution and its complicat-
ed causes, events, and aftermaths. What I have hoped to establish
is that there is room for argument and further study here—that one
can argue that the decade was either something more or something
other than a nightmare of human rights abuses, an assault on
humanism, a despotic power play by Mao, and so on. Of course
there were appalling instances of unjust persecution and violence.
This is not in question. What is in question is the humanist coding
of them and moreover of the entire era at the expense of the
other, positive or meaningful dimensions. Such a multiperspectival
approach is rendered virtually impossible by the enormous weight
and influence of the universal/Western humanist template in coding
what Chinese Maoism is and was. So what we have is, in short, a
nondebate between the great majority of writers on China (scholarly
and otherwise) and those few with alternative and non- or even theor-
etically antihumanist perspectives. Recall, again, the dominant im-
ages of political China: the Tank Man, something from the “scar
literature” memoir industry, a “human tragedy” from a natural disas-
ter among the uncountable masses, or the prototypical cinematic
image of a beautiful or haggard face, suffering (be it actress Gong
Li from days gone by or whoever the more contemporary analogue
might be).
This all flows together with the properly sinological analyses of,
say, Nathan or Friedman as invoked above or the standard analyses
contained in the works of Roderick MacFarquhar (see MacFarquhar
and Schoenhals 2006) or the Cambridge History of China (1986,
1987, 1992). What all these texts, images, and narratives presup-
pose is a humanism in at least two senses. One, “the” human sub-
ject, applies as well to China and the Chinese as anywhere else.
Chinese difference, whatever and howsoever that signifies, must
ultimately give way to its human sameness. And, two, the politics
of humanism, applies equally well to China as to anywhere else: in
short, what is needed there, and where it is inevitably headed in the
march of sameness/progress, is political liberalism and capitalist
democracy. Difference, in short, is still the problem for humanism.
The “China difference” is I would insist both real and virtually power-
less in the face of the humanist campaign. There is a powerful,
discursive drive to code China and the Chinese as either already
the-same or as inevitably caught up in the process of becoming-
the-same as the normative United States–West (liberal capitalist
democracy). It is this logic of sameness or general equivalence,
with its parallels to the logic of capital or exchange value as well
as modernization discourse, that subtends the new, sinological-
orientalism.15 Theother is not, as it was in Said’s Orientalism,
essentially different but becoming-the-same. Sinological-orientalism
has gone fully economic.
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It might be of some use, then, to further analyze the rise and
triumph of this “humanism” in regard to the production of knowledge
about China. My aim here is not to debunk it further but to situate it
within the context of recent changes within China and the world. I
want to conclude by examining a key part of this rise, which is not
simply the popularity of crypto-orientalist, anticommunist rhetoric but
the negation of actually existing Maoist discourse. The demand for
humanism within and in regard to China takes as one of its conditions
of possibility this same historical and discursive negation. Briefly
mapping this shift enables us to see that the turn to humanism
and the concomitant demonization of the Mao era and political
China reflects not the Truth of the revolution being finally, at long
last revealed from the “bamboo curtain” of oriental deception and
propaganda. It is rather a shift in the very terms and ways of seeing
the China of the revolutionary period—and of seeing the postwar era
of national liberations and revolutions. Put another way, this rep-
resents the present outcome of what Stuart Hall, drawing on Ray-
mond Williams’s notion of the dominant, emergent, and residual in
cultural formations, has theorized as the fundamental mode of poli-
tics: the struggle over the legitimation or delegitimation of discourse
as part of the work of hegemony (Hall 1988). While explicitly Maoist,
postliberation politics in China are residual, we can nonetheless
reconstruct in broad terms what Maoist discourse was like. This in
turn can allow us to restore some of the complexity and specificity
to China’s recent past and to circumvent the negation of all of
that through recourse to the standard notions of totalitarianism
(“brainwashing” and oriental despotism), the proper individual, and
so forth.
The revolution itself was a theoretical antihumanism. Recall, for
example, Mao’s eminently Marxist-Leninist, class-based critique of
humanism and human nature in the famous “Talks at the Yan’an
Conference on Art and Literature.” At that birthplace of the Maoist
regroupment, “humanism” was in the air among the urban artists
who had gone to join up:
But human nature only exists in the concrete; in a class society
human nature has a class character, and human nature in the
abstract, going beyond class, doesn’t exist. We uphold the
human nature of the proletariat, while the bourgeoisie. . .
uphold the human nature of their own class, although they
don’t talk about it as such but make it out to be the only kind
there is; in their eyes, therefore, proletarian human nature is
incompatible with human nature. (Mao 1980: 79)
This calls to mind Leon ’s 1938 classic Their Morals and Ours in its
insistence on the class division and analytical principle, even if it
departs from Trotsky’s own refusal of proletcult. In the event, there
simply was no place for a “humanist” aesthetic and the putatively
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natural right of individual artists to write for whom and how they
pleased. There was, though, and for at least the decades before
the Cultural Revolution, a place for the folk-art and locally rooted
yangge theater as well as for that great example of “revolutionary
romanticism and realism,” the fiction of Zhao Shuli. In short, even at
Yan’an in the late 1930s, it was class all the way down. For four
decades the search was for a new, Marxist form of the state and
an agitprop and cultural revolution that would fit the new China. The
humanists and writers of their ilk were, as Mao memorably put it,
“heroes without a battlefield, remote and uncomprehending” (1980:
85). The emphasis on class or, in short, Marxism was quite consist-
ent throughout the Maoist period; the Cultural Revolution then took
class—like everything else political—to its extremes. There radical,
impassioned, and contradictory notions of class identity and politics
were paramount.16 The point is not that it was dangerous to be a
“humanist” or “individualist” (whatever this means) at such a time
but that it was as likely as being, say, a hippie in the 1860s’ United
States. Revolutionary discourse was positioned against both liberal-
ism and humanism in quite emphatic and obvious ways, and this
means that to use the latter as the standard by which to measure
and read Maoist China is starkly anachronistic. One can of course
still bring theories of liberal individualism, humanism, and the like to
bear on China if one wishes (and not a few in China do this too). But I
do think one needs to acknowledge that the self-understanding of
Chinese subjects—and of the transformative revolution—during the
Red decades at least is very much at odds with such notions. So is
much of the current political culture (as defined by nationalism) and
mainstream ordinary culture (as defined by “Confucianism” or tra-
ditional mores and values). At the very least this presents a problem
for analysis.
I take the anthropological category of self-understanding to be
important for characterizing Maoist (or any) discourse and for seeing
the difference between this and the liberal/individualist humanism of
our present time. To briefly flesh this out, let me turn to a recent essay
by feminist historian Wang Zheng, who writes: “Everyone who was
talking, including the once victimizing Red Guards, was a victim scar-
red by the Maoist dictatorship. But I could not think of any example in
my life to present myself as a victim or a victimizer. I did not know how
to feel about my many happy memories and cherished experiences
of [that] time” (2001: 35). My point is not that Wang’s account here
is representative of all former Cultural Revolution participants. That
is too tall an order and not finally her point. But on the basis not just
of numerous personal conversations with former participants but
also texts like Jiang Wen’s 1994 film In the Heat of the Sun as well
as several scholarly works, I cannot help but think that Wang’s com-
ments apply to very many people.17 The key point here is that liberal
notions of human rights (and their implicit humanism) were simply
not in circulation during the highly politicized and revolutionary con-
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text of the immediate Chinese past, and the Cultural Revolution
period in particular (Gao 1994).18 For those within the revolution or
mainstream of Chinese society at the time (a very large crowd
indeed), the chief public and national-cultural subject positions avail-
able to be taken up were much more like what Wang Zheng (2001:
51) characterizes in her analysis of the Cultural Revolution period:
one could be a “revolutionary youth,” a “communist successor” (or
just a communist), or a “socialist constructor.” Politics and political
identity took intense, binary, dyadic forms not unlike those theorized
by Carl Schmitt in his friend/enemy distinction (Dutton 2008).
As Wang goes on to argue, the discursive formation of the time
was especially salutary in terms of the state’s emphasis on gender
neutrality. The strategy was
to situate citizens in a new kind of social relationship, to pull
both men and women out of the web of Confucian kinship obli-
gations and to redirect their ethical duties from their kin to the
party and the nation. Scholars of Communist societies may call
this statist scheme manipulation or domination, but few have
noticed that the enforcement of this scheme disrupted conven-
tional gender norms and created new discursive space that
allowed a cohort of young women to grow up without being
always conscious of their gender. (Zheng Wang 2001: 52)
Here we come to a pressing issue in regard to the interpretation of
China and our current theoretical dominant in the US-Western, if not
global, intellectual political culture: antistatism. For what now counts
as political liberalism in the world, not least within the United States–
West, the antistate, antigovernment, and ultimately antipolitical
viewpoint has become axiomatic. In terms of theory, many have
argued that the general political thrust of most postmodern theory
is an antistate libertarianism or crypto-anarchism (recall as well
Ju¨rgen Habermas’s argument for all of this being “conservative”)
(Brennan 2006). In terms of China this antistatism becomes still
more problematic, given the long tradition of orientalist thought
about despotism and authoritarianism being natural to the Chinese.
Hence Mao, and hence the persistence of Confucianism—according
to the liberal standpoint. And the general point of much of the
Chinese New Left, as well as more Marxist and Maoist leftists, is
that in an important sense China suffers from too little state (in
regard to market failures, national sovereignty, the importance of
state-owned enterprises and the jobs therein, as well as local corrup-
tion and abuses).19 But what I take to be the lesson from Wang
Zheng and much of the Chinese New Left is twofold: one, the Maoist
state indeed did some good, even beyond achievements in econ-
omics and class leveling, and this runs counter to standard, liberal/
humanist denunciations of the whole period, and, two, more broadly,
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your humanism may have constitutive political blindnesses that
leave you remote and uncomprehending.
Let us end in another place that stands opposed to humanism: the
“battlefield” Mao metaphorizes above. Where, today, in China or the
West would one find such a political battlefield, a place of commit-
ment politics, the radical imagination, and revolutionary intensities?
Where instead of the status quo and depoliticization there is a repo-
liticization of not only everyday life but also the public sphere and
intellectual culture? If Alain Badiou (2007) is correct that the twen-
tieth century was in part defined by a passion of, and for, the Real,
then at least two things emerge from this. One, under Mao China
was—for better and for worse—the site of this passion and politici-
zation and will remain important for this reason alone. And, two, our
great distance from this historical moment represents not the final
triumph of and return to liberal humanism but an intellectual as well
as political backlash.
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NOTES
1. And China and humanism (as seen from the West) is a very old
tradition dating back to the early Jesuit missionaries who saw
the Chinese in a “positive” light, proof of the universality of
Christianity.
2. The complicated relationship between China, China studies,
and colonialism and orientalism has been aptly diagnosed in
Barlow, 2005 and 1997.
3. For discussion of early post-Mao humanists, see Misra, 1998.
4. See the discussion (and translation) of Cai in Jason McGrath’s
superb analysis of the humanist spirit debates (2008: 46–48).
I am indebted to McGrath, though I am drawing harsher con-
clusions.
5. For discussion of the rise of the New Left versus liberalism in the
1990s, see Zhang, 2008.
6. The best English anthologies collecting the Left/liberal debates
in China are C. Wang, 2003, Davies, 2001, and Cao, 2005.
A case for a progressive neo-Confucianism can be found in
Bell, 2008. A popularized guide is Leonard, 2008, which also
partially translates Gan, 2007 and others. For further discus-
sion see Ban Wang and Lu Jie, 2012.
7. See the recent “A Hundred Years of Tsinghua, A Hundred Years
of Rising China” forum at www.huanqiu.com/www/1871/index
.html. For an overview, see Freeman and Wen 2011. For the
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Chongqing “model” in particular, see a recent issue of Modern
China edited by Philip Huang (2011).
8. Chinese liberalism too is not monolithic, but its strongest ex-
pression can be found in the “Charter 08” principally authored
by the imprisoned dissident Liu Xiaobo. For a partisan-liberal
overview, see Feng 2010. See as well the business magazine
Caijing. The charter itself can be found in English at Open
Democracy, 2010a. The adamant universality of its political
rhetoric is belied by its very particular neoliberal economics.
9. “Some will say my emphasis on the individual is ‘liberal,’ based
in capitalist presupposition of the value of the ‘possessive indi-
vidual.’. . .So what!” (Waters, 2009: 228).
10. This voice-over occurs near the very end of Carma Hinton and
Richard Gordon’s film and serves as the resolution. For a tran-
script of the film, see The Gate of Heavenly Peace, 1995.
11. The opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympics is a telling example
of persistent de-Maoification, just as the recent World Expo in
Shanghai begins China’s story of prosperity in Deng Xiaoping’s
year of triumph, 1979.
12. Lin Piao, former successor-designate to Mao Zedong in 1969,
was killed in a plane crash in 1972 after an apparent failed coup
attempt.
12. See also Meisner, 1996, Bramall 2007, and the discussion and
bibliography in Gao, 2008.
13. Wang Zheng makes this comment in the course of her interview
in Lee Feigon’s important documentary film, The Passion of the
Mao (2006).
14. For mainland e-media debates, see Gao, 2008 and the Utopia
website in China (2011), though note that “Utopia” is occasion-
ally unavailable due to state censorship. See also Andreas,
2009; Wu, 2007; Xing, 2001, Han, 2003; Law, 2003. The
post-Mao CCP depends on demonizing the Cultural Revolution
as radical chaos.
15. For an explication of this capital logic, see Jameson, 1990. For
more on the connection to orientalism, see Vukovich, 2011.
16. See Wu, 2007, in addition to others already cited.
17. In addition to Wang’s essay and the others collected in Zhong,
Wang, and Bai 2001, see David Davies, 2002.
18. For more on Maoist discourse, see Vukovich, 2011 and Dutton,
2008.
19. This is a consistent theme in the work of Wang Hui, Wang Shao-
guang, and Cui Zhiyuan, who are perhaps the best known of the
New Left scholars.
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